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Abstract 
From 1981 to 1992 New Zealand's occupational safety and health (OSH) legislation and administration has undergone a 
significant transformation. At the beginning of the period the situation can be described as a system of "Government 
Management", by 1990 a system of "Tripartite Management" had been partially introduced, in 1992 a new system of 
"Employer Hazard Management " had replaced existing arrangements. How did this transformation occur, why did it 
occur, and how does it compare with overseas examples? The transformation represents a case of reactionary politics. At 
the social level, change was a reaction to fears in the community about the dangers associated with the advent in New 
Zealand of large complex industrial plants, and the introduction of new chemicals. At the institutional level of organised 
actors, change was the result of reaction against perceived inadequacies in the existing legislative and administrative 
arrangements, and responses to positions adopted by competing actors. At the individual level change came about as 
organisations responded to the initiatives of certain individuals. By 1992, the colonial reliance upon overseas policy 
examples had been replaced with policy initiatives that reflected the level of knowledge amongst government officials, and 
the dominant forms of OSH management practiced by large New Zealand companies. 
Analysis of interview and documentary material gathered 
for a doctoral thesis indicates that from 1981 to 1992 New 
Zealand's occupational safety and health (os h) legislation 
and administration has undergone a significant transforma-
tion. The first part of the paper identifies, characterises and 
assesses the significance of the changes that have occurred. 
In the course of conducting the analysis, the main events in 
the change process are identified. A quick explanatory 
account for the legislative and administrative outcomes, and 
length of time taken for change to occur, is then given. The 
paper finishes by highlighting similarities between the New 
Zealand osh policy experience as described here, with a 
number of similar analyses reported in the international 
literature. 
Duringtheperiod 1981 to 1992NewZealand'soccupational 
safety and health legislation and administration under went 
a significant transformation. At the beginning of the period 
of change, 1981 , the situation can be described as a system 
of "Government Management", while by 1990 a system of 
"Tripartite Management" had been partially introduced, and 
in 1992 a new system of "Employer Hazard Management" 
replaced existing arrangements. A summary of these changes 
is presented in Figure 1 on the next page. The diagram serves 
to highlight the fact that anecdotal and other descriptions of 
the changes throughout the period as representing Robens 
style reform, de-regulation, or "self-regulation" (Hughes, 
1993: 1), are at best only partially accurate. To quote a 
representative of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, 
"the objective is not deregulation as such, but reform of 
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regulation" (Brook, 29 June 1989:8). In addition, descrip-
tions of the eventual outcome as representing a hazards 
management or risk management approach to osh, while 
accurate, do not adequately depict all the changes that have 
occurred, nor the continuities that remain. By discriminating 
more carefully between the different approaches in terms of 
the points of emphasis in each period, and in understanding 
the policy philosophy behind them as identified in the figure, 
a better description and understanding of the changes that 
have occurred can be arrived at. 
In 1980 the Walker Report (1981:9) described New Zea-
land's legislation as serving the function of "occupational 
hygiene", in that it focussed upon the control of specific 
types of hazards by specific means in particular industry and 
occupational groups. The approach suffered though from 
gapl> in workplacecoverage, and from anomalies in jurisdic-
tional application (Walker, 1981:1 ). To rectify this situation 
·walker recommended that New Zealand cautiously follow 
the British example as set out in the 1972 Robens Report 
(Walker, 1981:4 & 55-56). Subsequently, the Factory and 
Commercial Premises Act 1981 was passed. This Act 
amalgamated the 1946 Factories Act with the 1955 Shops 
and Offices Act, provided for the training of workers, set out 
the duties of employers and employees, signalled a move 
away from reliance upon detailed technical and prescriptive 
Regulations to less specific Codes of Practice (CoP), and 
provided for the possibility of health and safety committees 
and representatives. However the new legislation still left 
fourteen major Acts, seventeen minor Acts, and over fifty 
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Figure 1. Summary description and characterisation of New Zealand's OSH legislative 
and administrative arrangements as at December 1981, 1990, 1992. ©John Wren 1996 
Osh Situation at December 1981 Osh Situation at December 1990 Osh Situation at December 1992 
Government Management Tripartite Management Employer Management 
Administrative Arrangmzents Administrative Arrangmzents Administrative Arrangemmts 
Multiple Central Govemment Proposed: One Central One Central Government 
Authorities. Administrative Authority Authority located in the OSH 
Comprised Of Three Institutions. Service of the DoL 
Some Local Govemment 
Responsibility. In process of establishment One 
Central Govemment Authority 
located in the OSH Service of 
the DoL 
Funded From General Taxation. Funded From Special Employer Funded From Special Employer 
Levy via ACC. Levy via ACC. 
Legislative Arrangmzents Legislative Arrangements Legislative Arrangements 
Policy Philosophy: Policy Philosophy: Policy Philosophy: 
Government Responsibility Tripartite Responsibility Employer Responsibility 
(Modelled on Occupational (Modelled on ILO OSH (Hazards Management Approach Modelled on Loss Control and 
Hygiene Approach, and Part Conventions, 1972 Robens Risk Management Approaches). 
Robens Report). Report, and the Australian State 
of Victoria of the early to mid 
1980s). 
Multiple Acts And Regulations. One Act, Multiple Regulations One Act, Regulations 
And Codes Of Practice. Progressively Replaced By 
Multiple Codes Of Practice And 
Guidelines. 
Reliance Upon Prescriptive Mix Of Prescriptive Technical Reliance Upon Prescriptive 
Technical Specification Standards. Specification Standards And Perfonnance Standards, With 
Perfonnance Standards. Minimal Prescriptive Technical 
Standards. 
Minimal Recognition Of Workers' Positive Statements Of Workers' Minimal Recognition Of 
Rights. Rights. Workers' Rights. 
I .imited Coverage Of Work Sites. Full Coverage OfWork Sites. Full Coverage Of Work Sites. 
Implicit Public Safety. Explicit Incorporation Of Public Explicit Incorporation Of Public 
Safety. Safety. 
Mixed Liability Regime For Strict Liability Regime For Strict Liability Regime For 
Employers: Absolute And Strict Employers. Employers. 
Depending On Legislation. 
Discriminatory Working No Discriminatory Working No Discriminatory Working 
Provisions Against Women And Provisions Against Women And Provisions Against Women And 
Young People. Young People. Young People. 
Means to End: Effective Means to End: Effective Means to End: Effective 
G~u~~mm~nt Action EmJ2lQyee Action Bm12loyer Action 
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Regulations pertaining to osh in force (ACOSH Report, 
1988:3). One consequence of this multiplicity of regulation 
was that employers liability for health and safety varied from 
"absolute" to "strict". The Act also discriminated against 
women and young people in terms of hours of work and the 
types of work that they could do, and lacked any positive 
statement of workers ' rights. 
Administratively, responsibility for enforcing the legisla-
tion prior to 1981 and after the 1981 Act, was divided up 
amongst five government agencies, with Local territorial 
authorities having some responsibility. The government 
agencies concerned where: 
1. the Department of Labour (DoL) which had primary 
responsibility for industrial safety; 
2. the Department of Health (DoH) which had responsibility 
for occupational health; 
3. the Ministry of Transport (MoT) which had responsibility 
for boilers, lifts and cranes, port side safety, and the safety 
of seaman; 
4. the Ministry of Energy (MoE) which had responsibility 
for safety in mines and petroleum related activities; and 
5. the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) which 
promoted health and safety at work through education and 
training, and provided in the middle 1980s an health and 
safety audit service. 
Finally, funding of government activity in the osh area came 
from general taxation. 
In sum the arrangement of osh policy at December 198 1 
relied heavily upon government action, that is, government 
management. It was an arrangement that the Deputy Prime 
Minister Geoffrey Palmer in 1984 called the "Balkanisation 
of control" (Speech G. Palmer, 10 July 1986:3, in DoL fi le, 
19/5/5 1-3 Part4). The system was limited in its coverage, 
rigid in its modus operandi , and paternalistic in its provisions 
against the employment of women and young people, and in 
its prescriptive technical specifications for the control of 
hazards. 
By the mid- 1980s some change had occurred. In May 1985 
an officials only oversight committee, known as the Coordi-
nating Committee on OSH, which had met with little suc-
cess, was replaced by a tripartite 'advisory council' known 
as the Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and Health 
(ACOSH) (Cabinet Policy Committee Minute P(85) M 19 
Pt4, 21 May 1985; in DoL files). The legislative discrimina-
tory provisions against women and youth had been removed 
in 1982, extended paid Trade Union education was provided 
through the Trade Union Education Authority that had been 
established in 1986. In March 1987 a voluntary CoP for 
Health and Safety Committees and Representatives had 
been introduced on a trial basis. From 1986 onwards, 
funding of government osh related activity rapidly began to 
shift towards introduction of the 'user pays' principle. In the 
case of the DoL, funding for the Department's osh opera-
tions shifted in 1987 to a 'full cost recovery basis' through 
a special levy on employers that was collected via the ACC 
system (DoL paper "Funding of OSH and the ACC Levy" 
for Officials Working Party 16 September 1988:1, in DoL 
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files). 
More change was mooted in 1990 when new legislation was 
introduced into Parliament - the Occupational Safety and 
Health Bill (OSHB ). The legislation was intended to replace 
all the previous legislation, proposed the extension of 
protection to all workers including the general public af-
fected by any work activity, positively provided for work-
ers' rights, intended the establishment of a bipartite Com-
mission to advise Government on osh policy, placed more 
responsibility for osh action upon employers and employees 
including establishing a regime of 'strict' liability for em-
ployers, and undertook to replace prescriptive technical 
Regulations with less specific CoP. The legislation was 
never passed. Administratively , by 1990, responsibility for 
the enforcement of osh legislation had largely been del-
egated to the OSH Service of the DoL. Had the 1990 
legislative proposals been introduced, New Zealand would 
have seen a tripartite management system for osh intro-
duced. Paternal state intervention was going to be replaced 
by a system of joint government, union, and employer 
oversight and responsibility, that placed greater emphasis on 
employer and employee self-help. 
In 1991 the OSHB was withdrawn from Parliament and a 
new Bill introduced. The passage of the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act (HSEA) in 1992 saw the introduction of 
the final changes transforming New Zealand's osh policy. 
The HSEA placed responsibility for osh solely upon em-
ployers, extended coverage to all workers including the 
general public, removed any reference to extended workers' 
rights and a bipartite advisory Commission, placed empha-
sis upon prescriptive performance standards rather than 
specific technical requirements , and confirmed that funding 
for government activities in osh should come from a special 
ACC levy on employers . Administratively, the OSH 
Service had completed the transfer of the various govern-
ment agencies osh related resources to its control, and had 
contracted for the delivery to it of specific specialist serv-
ices. Tripartism had been rejected in favour of minimalist 
government involvement and a system emphasising the 
rights and responsibilities of employers to manage their 
affairs . With the passage of the 1992 Act, the focus had 
shifted from the situation in 1981 of Government telling 
employers what hazards to prevent and how they were to be 
controlled, to setting out a specification of a desired level of 
management performance underpinned by the application 
of a regime of 'strict liability ' in the event of an injury or 
illness occurring. Employer management responsibility was 
the new approach. 
The question remains, why are these changes deemed "sig-
nificant"? To answer this question two criteria derived from 
the theoretical work of Alain Touraine will be used. The first 
criteria asks, what is the degree to which the social relations 
of control have been significantly modified. The second 
criteria involves attempting to establish whether there has 
been any real change in the way that osh policy is thought 
about and administered by the bureaucrats concerned, and 
the other participating actors. 
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Regarding the first criteria it is argued that the OSH Bill, if 
it had been passed, it would have brought about a significant 
change in the balance of control over health and safety at 
work from government and employers, too workers. The 
1990 OSH Bill promised to give to workers and their 
representatives, far more formal power than they had ever 
had to protect their health. In addition to promising a re-
balancing of power between workers and employers, the 
OSH Bill held the promise, through the establishment of an 
"Advisory Commission", of a shift in power over the control 
of government osh activity from politicians and officials, to 
greater oversight and participation by union and employer 
organisations. It was a shift that was particularly sought by 
union representatives, in order "to get some legitimacy [for 
a) union role in the workplace and [at the) national level [of) 
policy making about health and safety" (Interview 4:384-
89). It was an endeavour half heartedly supported by 
employer representatives because, at the time, it was politi-
cally expedient to do so. As one employer representative 
interviewed said: "Generally speaking with reservations, 
Employers Federation was committed to tripartism under 
the Labour government. ... and if there [was) going to be a 
Health and Safety Commission 'by God' we were going to 
be on it" (Interview 7: 469-474). The rejection of the OSH 
Bill in favour of the HSEA by the 1990 National Govern-
ment, effectively ended union attempts to shift the balance 
of control. 
However in the context of a longer time frame and a wider 
perspective, the question has to be asked does the HSEA 
represent any significant shift from the beginning of the 
period as represented by the F&CP Act 1981. This is a more 
difficult question to answer. On one hand it co'uld be argued 
that the HSEA does represent a shift towards greater em-
ployer control, because employers have clearly been made 
explicitly responsible, and are now expected to actively 
identify and prevent workplace hazards without constant 
government oversight. Whereas the F&CP Act while plac-
ing the responsibility for health and safety upon employers, 
in practice, the Act effectively depended upon government 
agencies to identify hazards and stipulate means of preven-
tion. On the other hand there has been no significant shift 
between 1981 and 1992 since in both the F&CP Act and the 
HSEA, workers' rights receive only a passing acknowledg-
ment. Yet again, if a wider focus were to be taken that 
compared the industrial framework that existed in 1981 with 
that which exists now, it could be argued that in this context 
a significant change has occurred. At the beginning of the 
period a strong union support system existed, that no longer 
exists to the same degree today, thus there is less protection 
for workers now than there was then. Countering this point 
though. it could be argued that, while unions were certainly 
more powerful and prevalent in 1981 than they are now, 
unions are more knowledgeable and pro-active about health 
and safety than ever before. 
In terms of the second criteria, the evidence is much clearer 
that a significant change has taken place. The documents 
show that the policy situation in 1981 in government agen-
cies was essentially ad-hoc in nature, fragmented, largely 
based upon United Kingdom developments, and had no 
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explicit philosophical foundations (DoL paper 'One Act/ 
One Authority' 4 February 1988: 7-8, in DoL file 19/9/3-1 
Vol 2; and DoL paper "Legislation and Administration of 
Occupational Health and Safety" for 6th ACOSH meeting 
30 September 1986: section 1.2.2 & 1.2.3; in DoL File 19/ 
9/3-1 Vol2). The F&CP Act involved no major rethinking 
of how to manage osh, or fundamental change in the man-
agement of osh. Unions and employers had no formal policy 
statements on health and safety at work. However signs of 
significant change occurring, began to appear in 1983 with 
the advent of the first ever combined unions investigation 
into the role of workers in the management of osh (FoUCSU 
Report, 1985). The investigation was completed in 1985. In 
1983 the New Zealand Employers Federation published 
their first ever policy statement on health and safety for 
employers (TheEmployer:1983:4-5). In 1985 ACOSH was 
formed which was significant as it formally and publicly 
opened up discussion about osh policy beyond the confines 
of government agencies. In September 1988 the OSH Serv-
ice of the DoL established its own policy unit, which lead in 
October 1988 to the development of a coherent set of 
'preferred ' policies. 
The major change that has occurred, signalled by the OSH 
Bill and confirmed by the content of the HSEA, has been the 
development of osh policy in New Zealand that is not reliant 
upon overseas legislative examples, and is reflective of New 
Zealand's dominant form of knowledge in the late 1980s 
about osh prevention within government and big business 
(Wren, 1995). With the appearance of the 1990 OSH Bill 
came the first legislative proposals that had a predefined 
philosophical base. As one union interviewee said: "The 
OSH Bill really was the union agenda, that was our Bill, that 
was what we wanted ... that we picked up from Victoria and 
South Australia" (Interview 1 :286-287; 291). It was an 
approach buttressed by the Labour Government's initial 
support for possible ratification of IT...,O Convention 151 on 
osh policy (Cabinet Policy Committee minute P (85) M19 
Pt 4. May 1985, in DoL files) . 
The National Government though, preferred to adopt a 
philosophy of intervention advocated by big business in the 
form of representatives from members of the "Top Tier" 
group of industry (OSH Service Memo of meeting 5 July 
1989, in DoL file HSEB & A Vol2). The representatives of 
these groups of employers suggested that government with-
draw from any detailed intervention in their affairs. If 
government was to intervene, then it should use an approach 
that would promote the adoption by employers of "risk 
management systems" (OSH Service Memo of meeting 5 
July 1989, in DoL file HSEB & A Vol 2). Subsequently, 
officials of the OSH Service of the DoL chose to use the 
managerial philosophy found in the International Safety 
Rating System - of hazard identification, loss control, and 
audits - to construct and implement the new legislation 
(Interview 13: 1250-60 & Interview 12:39-87; DoL Report 
to the Labour Select Committee 1992: 116). It is the con-
scious adoption by big business and senior government 
officials of this particular form of intervention in osh that 
signifies a significant event. It is significant because it 
represents a clear break from dependence upon overseas 
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legislative models, and it reflects a policy solution clearly 
representative of the dominant philosophy of health and 
safety management found in large New Zealand businesses, 
and amongst senior government officials (Wren, 1995 ; 
Interview 13: 1250-60). It is also significant because it is 
consciously designed to be compatible with the industrial 
relations framework established in the Employment Con-
tracts Act 1991, and the accident compensation changes of 
1992. It is also compatible with the 'new right' economic 
philosophy implemented in New Zealand since 1984. 
The question now is, how are these change outcomes to be 
explained. It is clear from the interviews and the documen-
tary material, that the change process primarily originated in 
the mid-1970s within organisations representing workers 
and employers. Unions desired change because the existing 
arrangements were perceived as ineffective - particularly 
from 1974 onwards with the death of5 workers in a chemical 
explosion in Petone in that year. There was also an aware-
ness amongst union leaders and researchers of changes in 
overseas occupational safety and health legislation (Inter-
view 3: 1-114, 542-44; Letter from Kjellstrom to Fol 10 
March 1980, National Library, FoL File 5/9 F&CP Bill 
1977-Dec 1980). The awareness led to the idea in the early 
1980s in the union movement that the time was appropriate 
for New Zealand to update its legislative and administrative 
arrangements (Interview 3: 1-114, 542-44). At the same 
time employers desired change because they thought the 
multiplicity of administrative systems and regulatory provi-
sions were technically and economically outmoded, inter-
fering, and ineffective (Interview 6:28-58). Another pres-
sure point for change was an awareness amongst big busi-
ness and DoL officials of increasing concern within the 
general public about the effects of new chemicals and 
technology upon the health of individuals, communities, and 
the environment (Interview 6:292-93, 298-309; Interview 
11:86-88; DoL paper 30 September 1986: section 1.2.2; in 
DoL File 19/9/3- 1 Vol 2). Another source for change were 
demands from the mid-1980s onwards from Government 
Ministers for greater administrative efficiency and account-
ability from government agencies (DoL paper, 30 Septem-
ber 1986: section 1.2.2 & 1.3.1; in DoL File 19/9/3-1 Vol2). 
These demands for change in osh policy can be characterised 
and explained as a crisis of integration and a crisis of 
rationality (Touraine, 1977:87-88). A crisis of integration 
is one where a social problem exists that involves a contra-
diction in the organisation of work in capitalist economies. 
A crisis of rationality occurs when existing regulatory 
modes are perceived to be no longer working nor appropriate 
for new technologies and production methods. The de-
mands for change from unions on the basis that the existing 
osh policy was failing workers and that workers needed 
more power to protect themselves, would indicate a crisis of 
integration. In contrast, demands for change from employers 
representatives on the basis that the existing regulations 
were outmoded and inefficient indicate a crisis of rational-
ity. 
It is also clear that the 'general direction ' of the reforms were 
determined by the national elections changing the patterns of 
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power between the representatives of the two main opposing 
social classes (workers and employers) and their agents in 
the political-institutional sphere of action (the Labour Party 
and the National Party respectively). The 'detailed content' 
of the reforms though, reflects the particular rational recon-
ciliation by policy advisers within the OSH Service of the 
general direction given by the political decision makers, 
with the resources available, and their levels of knowledge. 
This does not explain though why a reformist and ostensibly 
pro-worker Labour Government could not pass new osh 
legislation after six years in power, while a pro-employer 
National Government did within two years of coming to 
power. However a number of reasons can be found, to 
explain this phenomena. 
The first reason is that osh reform in the first term of the 
Labour Government was very much a secondary priority for 
the Minister of Labour, whose first priority was the reform 
of industrial relations and public sector management (Rodger, 
S . Speech 4 February 1988:3, in CTU file Health & Safety 
Reps Vol1). With reference to the second term in office, the 
lack of progress may in a small part be explained by the 
turmoil within the leadership of the Labour Party in 1989, 
one result of which was the loss of Stan Rodger as the 
Minister of Labour early in August 1989. However this 
'loss' brought another very able politician to the portfolio-
Dr Michael Cullen, who saw the legislative reforms intro-
duced into Parliament. 
Another reason for the lack of earlier progress can be found 
in the delay caused by the desire for "consensus" by Labour 
politicians over the introduction of health and safety com-
mittees and delegates (Fourth ACOSH Minutes 27 May 
1986: 2, in DoL File 19/9/3-1 Vol1 ; Fifth ACOSH Minutes 
22 July 1986:3-5, in DoL File 19/9/3-1 Vol 1; Speech, E. 
lsbey 25 September:31-32, in DoL files; Speech, Rodger, S. 
4 February 1988:17- 18, in CTU file Health & Safety Reps 
V oi l). The delay caused by the deadlock over this issue was 
highlighted by officials who wrote to the Chair of ACOSH 
Mr lsbey late in September 1986: 
''The Department considers that it is essential that A COSH 
reach a decision on this topic at the next meeting, as there 
is a possibility that ACOSH will lose credibility, both 
within its member organisations and outside, if it is not 
able to conclude this matter soon. There are also other 
important topics which cannot be properly considered 
while this subject dominates the agenda" (DoL Memo to 
Mr Isbey, 23 September 1986, in DoL files). 
A further factor explaining the delay in osh reform can be 
found in the fact that neither political party had a coherent 
well thought-out policy on osh, this is particular! y true of the 
National Government. For example, Labour's 1984 policy 
consisted of one sentence in its industrial relations policy 
statement that said Labour will: 
" legislate to provide for occupational health services; 
improve the quality of the work environment; enforce 
requirements for health and safety standards in the 
workplace; provide for health and safety delegates and 
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committees at the workplace" (DoL background paper 
for Cabinet minute P (85) 61, 14 May 1985 :2, in DoL 
files) . 
As for the National Government, the Minister of Labour Mr 
Birch has acknowledged that "the Government had no feel 
for the issues in the osh area, unlike for employment con-
tracts where the policy was clear" (Record of meeting in 
Minister's office, 16 May 1989, in DoL file HSEB & A Vol 
2). The consequence of not having a well defined and 
thought out policy was that both Labour and National 
Government politicians had to learn about the topic in a 
climate of strong conflicting advice from government agen-
cies, while under pressure for change from their client 
supporters . 
To digress at this point to an ash policy issue; the examples 
given above while illustrating the lack of developed policy 
on ash amongst the two key political parties, they also 
clearly show that ash is considered an integral component of 
the ' industrial relations system' by both the political parties. 
Both the Labour and the National Government' s changed 
the industrial relations legislation prior to considering ash 
reform. Not only is osh considered an industrial relations 
issue, it is now established in New Zealand thanks to 
Treasury and the DoL, that the issue is discussed in the 
context of the ' labour market'. This means that any future 
discussion about ash policy rather than being framed in 
terms of wages, holidays, and working conditions, is now 
framed in the wider context of economic efficiency, employ-
ment growth, immigration, and industry training. One im-
portant implication of this finding is that it belies any 
arguments from employers representatives that ash is not an 
industrial relations issue, especially where the issue o f 
workers' rights and health and safety committees is being 
discussed. As one employer's representative interviewed 
put it : 
"The employers' line was that this [was] not an industrial 
relations issue, we want industrial relations kept out of it, 
that was our absolutely solid line. But the reality is that 
when your talking about health and safety representa-
ti ves and so on. you can' t do it without having the labour 
relations framework set up" (Interview 7:317-20). "Once 
you ' ve done that, once you have looked at what your 
industrial relations philosophy is, then the other things 
are going to flo w out of that" (Interview 7:828-29). 
Returning to reasons why the Labour Government failed to 
implement reform, there is clear evidence that suggests the 
Labour Government Minister of Labour Mr Stan Rodger 
was not that committed to the union proposals for health and 
safety committees and delegates, nor to the A COSH propos-
als. Regarding implementation of compulsory health and 
safety committees and delegates, in a letter to the New 
Zealand Employers Federation Mr Rodger commented: " I 
agree that introducing a mandatory system of Health and 
Safety committees under the present legislation would prob-
ably have little benefit and could possibly affect industrial 
relations ad verse! y" (Letter Minister ofLabour to EF 26 July 
1989: l , in DoL file 19/9/3-2). As for the ACOSH proposals, 
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the preface to the 1988 A COSH Report clearly indicates that 
the Report's recommendations did not represent Govern-
ment policy, and that the Government reserved the right to 
re-investigate the issue. 
Another factor that can be identified as contributing to the 
delay was the constant re-litigation of the issues by all the 
parties, particularly by government officials. One example, 
of the re-litigation of issues by officials can be seen in the 
actions of Area Health Boards (AHBs). Even after the 
recommendations of the "majority" of the 1989 Officials 
Report and the 1990 Transition Team Report were accepted 
by Cabinet (CAB (89) M23-17 10 July 1989; CAB (89) 
M45/46 18 December 1989; POL (90) M1-1 24 January 
1990) other officials from the Ministry of Transport, Minis-
try of Energy, and the AHB' s in particular, resisted the 
proposed changes. As late as April 199 1 the OSH Service 
had to request the intervention of the Minister of Labour Mr 
Bill Birch to "remove obstacles encountered in discussions 
with (Area Health) boards" who are attempting to "relitigate 
the issues" over the transfer of occupational health staff and 
related financial resources to the OSH Service (Letter from 
OSH Service to Minister of Labour, 30 April1991:1&3, in 
DoL file HSEB & A Vol 1). 
However, none of these reasons explain the phenomena of 
why a pro-employer party passed reforming osh legislation. 
The answer to this question is quite simply that, employers 
genuinely wanted reform albeit on their own terms. In 
addition the National Government did not have to do any-
thing to reform the administration of ash, as this had already 
been largely completed by the Labour Government. Fur-
thermore while the National Government did pass legisla-
tion, it is highly probable they would not of, if they hadn' t 
been faced with the OSH Bill on the Parliamentary agenda, 
and if employers weren' t so keen to see reform proceed 
themselves, particularly the removal of any threat to their 
managerial prerogatives posed by the OSH Bill (OSH Serv-
ice Memo of meeting 5 July 1989, in DoL file HSEB & A Vol 
2). 
Turning to the international literature on osh policy making, 
analysis shows that there are three core policy issues com-
monly debated in all nations (Wren, 1996). The first issue 
involves deciding the extent to which the state should 
intervene in regulating occupational safety and health. The 
next debate concerns consideration of how the state should 
instrumentally intervene in regulating occupational safety 
and health. For example should the state intervene by the use 
of legal precepts such as "strict liability" or more general 
"liability rules". The third key debate revolves around the 
extent to which workers' rights should be recognised. All 
three issues appear in the New Zealand debates. 
Throughout the change process in New Zealand the Treas-
ury and employers representatives argued for a minimalist 
role for government in ash, while the unions and the DoL 
have consistently argued for a stronger role. After the DoL 
established the case for government intervention, debate 
between all the parties raged over how government should 
intervene. The unions supported mechanisms that would 
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promote stronger standards and better enforcement. The 
employers supported a shift towards performance standards 
rather than strict technical specifications, and wanted more 
emphasis upon education about mechanisms to prevent 
workplace injuries and illnesses. The DoL supported meas-
ures such as the application of "strict liability" rules that 
would make enforcement eas ier. Treasury argued for a 
system that would allow parties to negotiate their own level 
of osh related risk in employment contracts, and which 
would be enforced through the freedom of individuals to 
take punitive tort actions in the courts. The issue of workers' 
rights was the major source of contention and difference 
between union and employer representatives, and their re-
spective political allies throughout the period. 
Turning to more specific comparisons in the literature, 
Ashford's (1976:535) conclusion that conflict is inherent in 
American occupational safety and health policy because of 
competing self-interests, lack of knowledge, differences in 
values, conflicts over governmental jurisdiction, and differ-
ences in disciplinary perspectives, and similar sentiments by 
Doern (1977: 16) in relation to Canada, is consistent with the 
New Zealand experience from 1981 to 1992. All the New 
Zealand participants in the process were competing to pro-
tect and enhance their positions. Positions that were based, 
in the case of employer and union representatives, upon 
differences about the perceived behaviour of the other in the 
workplace. Mendeloff's (1979:22) observation that the "de-
bates over procedural and substantive issues often revealed 
underlying differences in perceptions of management be-
haviour and the workings of the labour market" is particu-
larly pertinent at this point. In the case of New Zealand 
government officials, differences between the labour market 
perspective of the DoL, the health perspective of the DoH 
and later on the Area Health Boards, and the economic 
rationalism of Treasury all contributed to prolonging the 
process of reform, as politicians sought in vain for unanimity 
in advice from officials. 
The comments by Boehringer and Pearse (1986) that Aus-
tralian Commonwealth osh policy since the 1920s has seen 
the development of a dichotomy and conflict for domination 
between the domains of medicine and industrial relations, 
between health as a Health Department responsibility and 
safety a Labour Department responsibility, is equally the 
case in New Zealand up until the reforms of the late 1980s. 
In the end the conflict in New Zealand was resolved by 
subsuming the health perspective under the domination of 
the 'Labour Market' perspective of the DoL and Treasury, 
and with a deliberate attempt to circumvent the dichotomy 
between "health" and "safety" by concentrating upon ''haz-
ards" as opposed to individual "safety" and "health" matters. 
In the context of the ACOSH Report (1988) recommenda-
tions for new tripartite administrative structures, Doern's 
( 1977:27) comment that in Canada the key issue is really the 
level of "political will and resources available to the organi-
sation rather than ... any superficial or stylish preferences for 
the 'board' or the 'departmental' model", would seem to be 
equally relevant in New Zealand. The comparison is espe-
cially pertinent given that the changes that have taken place 
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in New Zealand have not seen any additional resources 
expended by Government on osh. Another observation 
made by Doem that is applicable to New Zealand up to the 
late 1980s at least, is his noting of the problem of inter-
departmental and intra-departmental coordination and con-
flict, as the result of ''empire building" and more simply the 
historical fact that most departments had been given many 
functions by past governments (Doern, 1977:27). 
A number of observations by another Canadian, Robert Sa ss 
(1986; 1989: 1993), also have a resounding echo in the New 
Zealand experience. Sass (1989: 157) has pointed out that 
throughout the 1970s occupational safety and health law in 
Canada underwent a broadening of concerns to include the 
issue of workers' rights. The same could be said for New 
Zealand albeit ten years later, and with different results. Sass 
(1989: 158) identifies the source for this "broadening of 
concerns" as Sweden and Norway; the same Nordic coun-
tries that the Walker Report referred to in 1981, and which 
inspired the first union moves to incorporate workers' rights 
into New Zealand legislation. Sass' (1989:165) comment 
that Canadian "management generally favoured the ' right to 
know', felt more reserved about 'effective' health and safety 
committees or the workers' right to participate, and defi-
nitely opposed the workers' ' right to refuse' dangerous 
work", also beautifully describes the attitude expressed by 
New Zealand employers representatives on the same issues. 
Another observation by Sass (1989:163-164) that has a 
resonance in New Zealand, is his view that osh policy in 
Canada, particularly in relation to workers' rights, is dis-
cussed in the context of "management prerogatives" and 
"liberal utilitarian concept of justice and not upon demo-
cratic criteria". The resonance in this observation of Sass'. is 
heard most clearly in the policy position espoused by Treas-
ury (Treasury paper T9011875: 1, 28 May 1990; Treasury 
paper T91/3433 6 August 1991; Treasury letter to Minister 
ofFinance, 15 August 1991) and the New Zealand Business 
Round table ( 1988) 
Another point that appears in the literature, which can be 
seen to have a strong echo in New Zealand, is the absolute 
fiction of the '"traditional hegemonic ideology" associated 
with osh that osh is divisible from industrial relations (Carson 
1970, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1989; & Henenberg, 
1988; &Johnstone, 1990; Quinlan, 1993: 140-150; Creighton 
& Gunningham, 1985:3-5; Beaumont, 1983). The separa-
tion of occupational safety and health from industrial rela-
tions as a policy issue is a fiction particularly encouraged by 
the employers. The purpose of the distinction can only be 
seen as an ideological one that serves employers purposes , 
as it is a useful negotiating tactic to limit any gains by 
workers in one arena of industrial relations from being 
transferred to another. In New Zealand the fic tion has no 
basis in reality , as indicated by the comments made by 
employers representati ves interviewed, the fact that both 
political parties in New Zealand explicitly situate their osh 
policy within their industrial relations policy, and that osh 
policy is now discussed in the context of the 'labour market'. 
Another similarity between the literature and the period of 
change in New Zealand under the L abour Government, is the 
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aptness of Grabe's (199 1) analysis regarding tripartite osh 
policy processes in Great Britain. Grabe (1991:59) com-
ments that while tripartite arrangements are a way of enhanc-
ing the likelihood that new regulations will be accepted, they 
are "slow", as consensus is aJ ways sought in decisions made. 
Furthermore where a consensus outcome fails to occur, 
stalemate results and the parties move their debate to another 
arena. Delay in the process is exacerbated because "much 
happens behind the scenes, including intervention by senior 
management people, and informal trade-offs are part of the 
procedure [and] the compromise reached at the end strongly 
reflects the power that the participant groups represent 
outsidethescopeofaparticularcommittee' '(Grabe, 1991:60). 
Grabe's analysis describes very closely the reform process 
under the Labour Government, and in particular the course 
of the debates in A COSH over the voluntary CoP for Health 
and Safety Committees and Delegates. 
The final study in the literature that has a clear reflection in 
the New Zealand policy debates between Treasury and DoL 
officials in 1991, is Gunningham' s ( 1984) analysis of safety 
law in Australia. Particularly interesting here is. is his 
discussion of the methods of prosecution that can be adopted, 
and the form of establishing guilt for osh offences 
(Gunningham, 1984:77-87, 275-297). For Gunningharn 
(1984) , establishing guilt means proving beyond reasonable 
doubt what the defendant' s intention was (eg 'state of mind' 
-mens rea) when the alleged offence occurred. In some 
cases, it is sufficient to only show that ' negligence' has 
occurred. The issue of "mens rea" is critical, unless it has 
been replaced by a concept of "absolute" or "strict" liability, 
as usually happens with occupational safety and health law. 
In which case it is sufficient to only prove that the event 
occurred regard less of the defendant 's intention 
(Gunningham, 1984:82-83). The justification for this ap-
proach is public interest in "efficient law enforcement" 
(Gunningham, 1984:82, footnote 24). 1 
An alternative to "strict liability" is the preference for 
"liability rules" orientated towards establishing the case for 
negligence that is put forward by economists from the 
Chicaao school of economic thou£ht (Gunningham, 
0 2 ~ 
1984:275-87). In the context of occupational safety and 
health, negligence rules would assign rights and responsi-
bilities to specific parties based upon assessment of duty of 
care and the costs and benefits associated with compliance. 
Liable negligence would be established where a party failed 
to take cost justifiable actions that would have prevented the 
unwanted event from happening. The justification for this 
legal preference is that freedom of choice is enhanced, and 
the need for costly state enforcement would be reduced as 
the " liability rules" replicate market forces that would ap-
portion costs efficiently and thus help promote injury/ illness 
prevention (Gunningham, 1984:287). This discussion by 
Gunningham of alternative forms of government interven-
tion reads as a ·script' for the arguments put by Treasury and 
the DoL to Government in August 1991. Treasury arguing 
for the application of negligence and liability rules (Treas-
ury paper T90/ 1875: 1, 28 May 1990; Treasury paper T91/ 
3433 6 August 1991; Treasury letter to Minister of Finance, 
15 August 1991), the DoL arguing for strict liability (DoL 
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paper, 1 October 1988: 17-18; OSH Service report to Minis-
ter of Labour, 22 August 1991 : 1-4). The confluence here of 
Gunningham' s discussion with the New Zealand debates, 
highlights the common British legal heritage that both coun-
tries share and the influence that has upon how osh legisla-
tion is framed. 
Summary 
In summary significant changes have occurred in New 
Zealand's osh policy during the period 1981 to 1992. At the 
beginning of the period the situation can be described as a 
system of"Govemment Management", by 1990 a system of 
"Tripartite Management" had been partially introduced, in 
1992 a new system of"Employer Hazard Management" had 
replaced existing arrangements. Furthermore, by 1992, the 
colonial reliance upon overseas policy examples had been 
replaced with policy initiatives that reflected the level of 
knowledge amongst government officials, and the domi-
nant forms of OSH management practiced by large New 
Zealand companies. The origins of these changes can be 
traced to a crisis of integration and rationality. A comparison 
of theosh policy literature with the New Zealand experience 
shows that there is a high degree of convergence between 
New Zealand and the policy issues debated overseas, and the 
policy positions taken by participants- irrespective of cul-
tural differences and institutional arrangements. Various 
comments by observers of the osh policy process and de-
bates in Canada, Great Britain, and Australia, can be seen to 
have direct relevance to New Zealand. The comparison 
hicrhlicrhts the fact that at the core of osh policy in New 0 0 
Zealand and world wide, is a conflict, inherent within the 
capitalist system of production, over the forms of control of 
the social relations of health and safety in the workplace. It 
is a conflict whose outcome is determined by who holds the 
balance of power in the political system, and the dominant 
level of knowledge amongst government officials . 
Future research 
The opportunities for research into the subject of occupa-
tional safety and health in New Zealand are endless. Three 
areas offuture research can be quickly identified. Evaluative 
research into the efficacy ofNewZealand's current approach 
to the regulation of occupational safety and health is an 
imperative. However such research is fraught with many 
difficulties. Difficulties such as the lack of reliable New 
Zealand statistical data, and problems associated with any 
international comparison. Another priority for investigation 
is how to balance the tension between the desire for the 
promulgation of non-prescriptive standards while providing 
sufficiently detailed information that is potentially techni-
cally prescriptive, confusing and quickly out of date. The 
third area of research is a real need for analysis that is 
critically aware and theoretically informed about the rela-
tionships between occupational safety and health policy 
issues and the management of occupational safety and health 
in the workplace. Any New Zealand literature search 
quickly reveals that there is a dearth of such literature. 
Provision of such analyses would improve the debates 
surrounding the regulation of occupational safety and health 
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in New Zealand, and hopefully lead to the development of 
innovative solutions appropriate to New Zealand. 
Notes 
1. According to Gunningham (1984:83) there are two de-
fences to "strict" liability: ( 1) "reasonable mistake of fact" , 
and (2) "circumstances beyond the defendants control". The 
applicability of these defences depends upon the wording of 
the statutes concerned and the criminal code that applies in 
the particular jurisdiction. 
2. For example: Steigler (1971); Diehl & Ayoub (1980) in 
Peterson & Goodale (ed) ; Waiter (1973, 1974); Rinefort 
(1977); Smith (1980) in Peterson & Goodale (ed); Coase 
(1960); Viscusi (1979; 1983, 1996). 
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